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ABSTRACT
Using data from a field experiment in Kenya, we document that providing individuals with simple
informal savings technologies can substantially increase investment in preventative health and reduce
vulnerability to health shocks. Simply providing a safe place to keep money was sufficient to increase
health savings, through a mental accounting effect. Adding an earmarking feature was only helpful
when funds were put towards emergencies; earmarking for preventative health reduced savings on
average, because the liquidity cost of tying up money was too great. Providing social pressure and
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In developing countries, the returns to many types of investments in human or physical
capital appear to be high, yet investment levels remain quite low. For example, it has been
estimated that 63 percent of under-ﬁve mortality could be averted if households invested in
readily available preventative health products (Jones et al. 2003). Why don’t people make
these investments? While credit constraints are the most obvious culprit, and while recent
evidence does suggest that relieving credit constraints can increase investments in bednets
(Tarozzi et al. 2011) or clean water connections (Devoto et al. 2011), the upfront costs of
many preventative products (such as bednets) are not massive. Households should be just
as able to gradually save up for such investments as to take out loans and gradually pay
them back.
To understand why the poor are constrained in their ability to save, we designed a ﬁeld
experiment in rural Kenya in which we randomly varied access to four innovative saving de-
vices which diﬀered in the degree of commitment they oﬀered. One saving technology oﬀered
only a very soft form of commitment through mental accounting. Two other products oﬀered
stronger commitment through earmarking. A ﬁnal product, in addition to earmarking, of-
fered credit as well as a social commitment to make regular contributions. By observing the
impact of these various technologies on asset accumulation, and by estimating which types
of people beneﬁt most from them, we can identify the key barriers to saving in our study
context.
Though the saving technologies we study could be relevant for any number of purposes,
we designed them around enabling savings for health investments. The reason for this is
that poor health is very common in Kenya (as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa), so that there
are likely substantial welfare eﬀects of increasing savings for health.
Our main outcomes are (1) take-up of the savings technologies; (2) investment in preven-
tative health products; and (3) whether households are able to deal with health emergencies
when they arise. We compare the four treatment groups to a control group which received
the same encouragement to save for health but was not oﬀered a savings technology. Our
primary data are follow-up surveys conducted after 6 and 12 months with 771 individuals.
We supplement this with a longer-run follow-up conducted about three years later with a
random subsample.
Our ﬁrst main result is that the take-up of all four saving technologies was very high.
After 12 months, the take-up rate for the least popular technology was 66%, while it was
97% for the most popular. These take-up ﬁgures suggest that the primary appeal of the
devices is in their common feature: providing a safe and designated place to save money for
1a speciﬁc goal. The main mechanism through which the products increased health savings
appears to be mental accounting. In follow-up surveys, respondents reported that once the
money was set aside, they had the strength to resist “unplanned expenditures,” including
transfers to friends and relatives and luxury spending. This mental accounting channel is
why people were able to save even in the product in which the money was readily accessible.
Turning to impacts on health investment, our second main result is that earmarking
for preventative health investments was ineﬀective for the average individual. By contrast,
earmarking for health emergencies increased people’s ability to cope with shocks. The reason
that earmarking for preventative health was not an attractive feature is that earmarking
brings with it the substantial liquidity cost of not being able to access money when it is
needed for other purposes (in particular health emergencies). By contrast, earmarking for
health emergencies allows precisely the types of emergency withdrawals that people are most
concerned about, and so was highly valued.
Our third main result is that providing credit and social pressure to make deposits for
health in a group setting (in this case, a Rotating Savings and Credit Association, or ROSCA)
is a highly eﬀective means of increasing health investments.
We provide further but somewhat more speculative evidence on the savings barriers that
these devices helped overcome by examining how impacts varied with background charac-
teristics. First, we ﬁnd that individuals who, at baseline, were the most “taxed” by their
social networks (people who were giving assistance to others but who received no assistance
in return) are the only subgroup which continued to save when deposits were earmarked for
preventative health. We conjecture that the demands on their income are strong enough
that limiting liquidity is not as costly for them. While we cannot entirely rule out that the
diﬀerential eﬀects we see for these “providers” are potentially driven by some unobservable
characteristics correlated with provider status, it is worth noting that our ﬁndings are con-
sistent with a number of recent studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, which suggest that people
might be willing to pay to avoid demands from others.1
Second, our results suggest that time-inconsistency might be another important con-
straint. As might be expected, those with time-inconsistent preferences (who make up about
1Baland et al. (2007) present evidence from Cameroon consistent with a model in which middle-class
individuals take on (costly) loans they do not need as a way to signal poverty and avoid requests for ﬁnancial
help from friends and relatives. Similarly, a recent experimental study in Western Kenya ﬁnds that women
are willing to pay a substantial cost (in the form of either a fee or foregone returns) in order to hide income
from their relatives (Jakiela and Ozier 2011). This is consistent with Platteau (2000), who shows that there
exist strong social norms in West Africa which necessitate that an individual provides support to friends and
relatives if she is asked for money and has cash on hand. However, our results do contrast somewhat with a
recent ﬁeld experiment in Ghana, which ﬁnds no evidence that external pressure to share is responsible for
the inability of many small entrepreneurs to invest cash grants in their business (Fafchamps et al. 2011).
216% of our sample) did not beneﬁt from gaining access to a simple savings device in which
withdrawals were not restricted. They also did not beneﬁt from earmarking, but did save in
the product which oﬀered credit and social commitment to make deposits. We conjecture
that this combination worked because the credit aspect induced people to begin saving, and
the social pressure aspect compelled them to make regular deposits. These results suggest
that people with such preferences may need products which not only earmark savings for a
speciﬁc purpose but which also commit them to make regular deposits. That some form of
commitment is needed for people with time-inconsistent preferences resonates well with evi-
dence from multiple settings – from retirement savings in the US (Thaler and Benartzi 2004;
Choi et al. 2011) to bank savings in the Philippines (Ashraf et al. 2006a) to agricultural
investments in Kenya (Duﬂo et al. 2010) and Malawi (Brune et al. 2011). Our contribution
is to show that, in the absence of a direct deposit or deposit collection feature, earmarking
alone is not suﬃcient to meaningfully increase savings among time-inconsistent individuals.
This is consistent with Ashraf et al. (2006a), who ﬁnd that many time-inconsistent individ-
uals in the Philippines are “sophisticated” enough to sign up for a commitment device, but
not enough to use it once they have it.
Third, we also ﬁnd some tentative evidence of intra-household barriers to individual
saving. We ﬁnd somewhat larger eﬀects for married women than for unmarried women. Here
again, we cannot entirely rule out that this is driven by some other characteristic correlated
with marital status, but we note that the heterogeneity we observe is consistent with evidence
of savings misallocation due to intra-household heterogeneity in time preferences found in
Kenya by Schaner (2011). It is also related to experimental evidence from the Philippines
presented in Ashraf (2009), which showed that hiding money from one’s spouse is desirable
under certain intra-household decision-making structures.
All in all, our results suggest that devices which simply help individuals harness the
power of mental accounting are beneﬁcial to the majority of people in our sample. Since
much of the value of a savings product appears to be in the mental accounting it provides,
a product which does not severely limit liquidity is preferred to one that does, especially for
people living in an environment in which income shocks are common, such as rural Kenya.
Our results contribute to a fast-growing literature on savings in developing countries. It
has by now been well established empirically that the reason for low observed savings rates
is not just that the poor are simply “too poor to save.”2 Several studies have investigated
2For example, Shipton (1990) describes how people in the Gambia make their own wooden lockboxes,
which they smash open once they have reached their savings goal. Collins et al. (2009) examine a wealth of
other informal saving tools used by poor families in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa. Rutherford (2000)
documents how poor households often report wanting to save more. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2007), looking at
detailed household survey data form 13 countries, ﬁnd that even extremely poor households do not use all
3reasons for such undersaving, but as with developed countries, much of the existing litera-
ture puts the emphasis on self-control problems. Bernheim, Ray and Yeltekin (1999, 2011)
propose a model in which self-control problems can lead to a low-asset trap. In their model,
self-discipline through personal rules is harder when one is poor and credit constrained than
when one is rich and has access to credit, because the cost of deviating from personal rules is
limited when one has very little to lose. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) argue that there
are “temptation goods” (goods whose consumption yields utility in the present, but whose
future consumption yields no utility), so that the consumption of these goods by future
selves serves as a “temptation tax” on savings. If there is satiation in temptation goods such
that their consumption share declines with income, then a poverty trap can emerge since
poor people face a higher eﬀective tax and therefore have a lower incentive to save than
richer people. Both theories are consistent with studies which ﬁnd demand for some form of
commitment among people in developing countries (Ashraf et al. 2006a; Duﬂo et al. 2010;
Brune et al. 2011). A more recent strand of literature puts emphasis on limited attention.
Karlan et al. (2011) provide experimental evidence from a multiplicity of countries that
simple reminders to save can increase saving rates by about as much as access to commit-
ment savings products. Likewise, Kast et al. (2011) shows that interventions to encourage
deposits (through peer groups or text message reminders) can increase savings rates.
Our evidence is consistent with the presence of both self-control and inattention problems,
but suggests that, for most people, these barriers can be alleviated without resorting to
services such as formal commitment savings accounts or reminders. In our study, a simple
safe place to save is enough to increase preventative health investment by at least 68 percent,
and increase the likelihood that people reach their savings goal by 13 percentage points within
a year. This is substantially larger than the 6 percent increase in savings and 3 percentage
points increase in goal-reaching observed by Karlan et al. (2011) through monthly reminders
over a 6 or 12 month period. It also compares favorably with the impacts of the commitment
product studied by Ashraf et al. (2006a) in the Philippines. They ﬁnd an 81% increase
in bank savings after 12 months, but the eﬀect fades to (a statistically insigniﬁcant) 33%
increase after 2.5 years (Ashraf et al. 2006b). Also, in that study, only 10% of those oﬀered
the commitment product actively used it. In contrast, the take-up rate of our most basic
product was 71 percent in the ﬁrst year, and still close to 40 percent after three years.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
technologies we introduced and the underlying theoretical framework. Section 3 describes
of their income to aﬀord basic necessities. Dupas and Robinson (2009) ﬁnd that simple bank accounts can
increase savings and investments among market vendors in rural Kenya.
3Note that this long-term ﬁgure was measured two years after the last contact with the research team,
that is, two years after the last potential “reminder” to save.
4the sample, the timeline of the experiment and the data. We discuss the results in terms
of medium-run take-up (Section 4) and impacts (Section 5) before we describe longer-run
evidence in Section 6. We then bring on evidence from exit surveys to discuss mechanisms
in Section 7, before we conclude.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Experimental Saving Technologies
As we will describe below, two of our four savings technologies involved a social component.
For this reason, we had to work with existing social structures in order to implement the
study. We chose to work with one of the most common social structures throughout the
developing world: local saving circles called ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit Associ-
ations). A ROSCA is a group of individuals who come together and make regular cyclical
contributions to a fund (called the “pot”), which is then given as a lump sum to one member
in each cycle. While people who participate in ROSCAs are clearly a self-selected group,
they are still representative of a relatively large share of the population, since over 40% of
adults in our study area participate in ROSCAs.4
We worked with 113 ROSCAs in one district of Kenya, and randomly assigned these
ROSCAs to one of ﬁve study arms (one control and four diﬀerent experimental treatment
arms). Individuals in all study arms were encouraged to save for health and were asked to
set a health goal for themselves at the beginning of the study, but only individuals in the
treatment arms were oﬀered a saving device to help them reach that goal.
In the ﬁrst experimental treatment (Safe Box), respondents were given a simple locked
box made out of metal. The box had a deposit slit at the top, similar to a piggy bank. The
box was locked with a padlock, and the key to the padlock was provided to the participants.
Each participant was also given a passbook in which they could record the deposits made
in the box, so that they could keep track of the total amount in the box without having to
open it. They were asked to record what health product they were saving for, and its cost,
on the front page.
In the second experimental treatment (Lockbox), respondents were given a passbook and
a locked box identical to those in the Safe Box treatment, except that they were not given
the key to the padlock. Instead, the key was kept by the program oﬃcer, so that respondents
could not open the box on their own. The cell phone number of the program oﬃcer was
4In the Appendix, we use data from a census of rural households in a nearby part of Kenya to examine
determinants of ROSCA participation.
5written on the passbook, and participants were instructed to call the program oﬃcer once
they had reached their saving goal. The program oﬃcer would then meet the participant
and open the Lockbox at the shop where the product could be purchased.5,6
In the third experimental treatment, we encouraged participants to use their existing
ROSCA structure to create a “Health Pot.” The Health Pot was simply a side pot that the
members could contribute to in addition to the regular ROSCA pot. As with the regular
pot, people would contribute to the health pot at each meeting. The only diﬀerence was that
this pot would be earmarked for a speciﬁc health product. To keep the logistics manageable,
we encouraged people to save for the same product (so that contribution amounts and cycle
lengths did not vary across people). The size of the health contribution would depend on the
health product chosen and the number of people participating in the Health Pot scheme. For
instance, if 10 out of 15 ROSCA participants decided to create a side pot in order to acquire
a bednet worth 250 Ksh, each participant would have to contribute 25 Ksh to the side pot
at each meeting so that one participant could receive the bednet. To ensure that the health
pot would be used to acquire the chosen product, ROSCAs were encouraged to purchase the
health product on the behalf of the pot recipient or to accompany the pot recipient to the
shop where the product was to be purchased, instead of letting the recipient walk away from
the meeting with the pot in cash.7
The fourth experimental treatment (Health Savings Account, or HSA) also took advan-
tage of the ROSCA structure, but this treatment did not require agreement across members.
Each participant was encouraged to make regular deposits into an individual HSA managed
by the ROSCA treasurer. The treasurer was given a ledger book in which to record deposits,
withdrawals and balances for each member’s account. The funds deposited into the HSAs
were earmarked for health – ROSCA treasurers were encouraged to not allow withdrawals
unless the participant needed money for health expenditures (such as clinic fees or medica-
tions). The money saved in HSAs by ROSCA members was usually kept by the treasurer of
the ROSCA, or deposited in a bank account if the ROSCA owned one.8
5Providing boxes was inspired by the lockbox oﬀered as part of the SEED program designed by Ashraf,
Karlan, and Yin (2006a). In that study, participants would have to bring their lockbox to the bank to get it
opened and the money in the box would be immediately deposited into the bank account by the bank teller.
6While the program oﬃcers told individuals that they could only use the money for their health savings
goal, this could not actually be enforced in the ﬁeld. If, for example, a respondent called the program oﬃcer
to open the box but demanded to use the cash for something else, the program oﬃcer could not force her
to follow through on her goal. However, the vast majority (74%) of those who called the program oﬃcer to
open the box purchased the product in front of the program oﬃcer. The remainder said that they would do
so later. In a follow-up survey, we asked people if they thought that they were allowed to get the box opened
to purchase something other than their goal, and only 6% said they thought they could. Thus it seems that,
as intended, people thought of the lockbox as featuring strong commitment.
7As discussed later, the majority did this (see Table 2).
8Many ROSCAs hold money with the treasurer, either because they have a welfare insurance fund or
6As we will discuss below, as these technologies diﬀer in the type and amount of commit-
ment features they provide, comparing savings under the diﬀerent technologies will allow us
to estimate which features are most important and to back out the relative importance of
various savings barriers. However, the technologies also diﬀer in one other important way:
two of them were geared towards mobilizing savings for preventative health products (the
Lockbox and the Health Pot), one was geared towards building savings to rely on in case
health shocks occur (the HSA), and one was geared towards both these aims (the Safe Box).
Thus, in our empirical analysis, we separately examine the two types of savings in estimating
eﬀects.
2.2 Features of the Experimental Technologies
As shown in Figure 1, the four experimental saving technologies oﬀered various combinations
of a set of three features: secure and designated storage, earmarking, and social commitment
bundled with credit.






Panel A. Technologies Enabling Savings Towards Preventative Health Investments
P1 Safe Box Yes
P2 Lockbox Yes Yes
P3 Health Pot Yes Yes Yes
Panel B. Technologies Enabling Savings Towards Emergency Health Treatments
T1 Safe Box Yes
T4 HSA Yes Yes
The most basic intervention was the Safe Box, which provided only a designated, secure
place to store money. The Lockbox and HSA interventions diﬀered from the Safe Box only
in the earmarking they provided: the money stored in these two schemes could not be spent
on anything other than preventative health and medical expenditures, respectively. Finally,
the Health Pot featured social commitment and credit on top of the earmarking and storage.
The social commitment feature comes from the fact that ROSCAs by deﬁnition exert group
pressure to make deposits. This is a much stronger form of commitment than the individual
oﬀer individual credit to members (in addition to the main pot). See Appendix Table A1.
7savings technologies: while any money put into the Lockbox, HSA, and Health Pot could only
be used for health, only the Health Pot provided any pressure to actually make deposits.
The credit feature of the Health Pot comes from the fact that all but the last member of the
group would receive the health product earlier than they would if they instead saved alone.
If we call P1, P2, and P3 the eﬀects on preventative health investments of, respectively,
the Safe Box, the Lockbox, and the Health Pot, we can estimate the role of having a safe and
designated storage technology for preventative health savings as P1; we can estimate the role
of earmarking as (P2 − P1); and we can estimate the combined roles of social commitment
and credit as (P3 −P2). Likewise, if we call T1 and T4 the eﬀects on availability of funds for
health emergencies of, respectively, the Safe Box and the HSA, then T1 will reﬂect the role
of having a storage technology; and (T4 − T1) will reﬂect the role of earmarking.9
2.3 When Should These Features Matter?
We expect the three features to have diﬀerential eﬀects on health savings, depending on the
types of savings barriers that individuals face.
Storage There are two important ways through which access to a safe storage technology
designated for savings can aﬀect saving behavior.
First, even though outright theft of money is not commonly reported by respondents,
people may be hesitant to simply leave cash unsecured at home. For this reason, a secure
storage technology can enable individuals to avoid carrying loose cash on their person and
thus allow people to keep some physical distance between themselves and their money. This
may make it easier to resist “temptations”, to borrow the terminology in Banerjee and
Mullainathan (2010), or “unplanned expenditures”, as many of our respondents call them.
While these unplanned expenditures include luxury items such as treats, another important
category among such unplanned expenditures are transfers to others.
Second, a storage technology can increase the “mental costs” associated with unplanned
expenditures, thereby reducing such expenditures. Indeed, if people use the storage technol-
ogy to save towards a speciﬁc goal, people may consider the money saved as unavailable for
purposes other than the speciﬁc goal – this is what Thaler (1990) coined “mental account-
ing”. By enabling such mental accounting, a designated storage place may give people the
strength to resist frivolous expenditures as well as pressure to share with others, including
their spouse.
9Note that since the Safe Box oﬀered the ﬂexibility to save towards something else than health, the
impact of having a safe and designated storage technology on overall savings may well be larger than the
sum of the eﬀects we estimate with P1 and T1.
8In Section 7, we will discuss results from in-depth exit interviews we conducted with a
random subset of respondents. Those interviews yield evidence which shows that both of
these eﬀects (physical distance and mental accounting) were at play and explain the large
observed impacts of the Safe Box.
Earmarking Earmarking (E) has an obvious liquidity cost. Thus, if earmarking enables
savings for some people, it must be that for them the value of the earmarking outweighs the
liquidity cost. There are two types of people for whom that might be the case. First, ear-
marking might help people for whom the pressure to share is so strong that they need a way
to tie up money. Second, earmarking might be valuable for people that are trying to over-
come intra-personal barriers (those with time-inconsistent preferences). Among this group,
only “sophisticated” individuals should value earmarking to impose self-control, however,
since “naive” individuals, by deﬁnition, lack the awareness to see the value of it.
An important point is that the value attached to earmarking for preventative health in-
vestments (P2−P1) might diﬀer from the value attached to earmarking for health emergencies
(T4 − T1). In particular, in our study context, it is likely that earmarking for emergencies is
valued more than earmarking for preventative health. This is because the most important
form of risk facing rural households in Western Kenya is illness, and the HSA was speciﬁ-
cally designed to allow withdrawals for such shocks. This means that the HSA had a much
lower “liquidity cost” than the Lockbox. In addition, people may simply value savings for
emergencies more than for preventative health.
Social Commitment and Credit (C) This bundle, given the credit aspect, should ap-
peal to everyone in our sample (especially since they are already engaged in the ROSCA).
Its eﬀect should be largest for those naive present-biased individuals, for whom neither a
designated storage place nor earmarking alone would be enough, as discussed above.
3 Sample and Data
3.1 Sampling Frame and Randomization
Between May and July 2008, we compiled a “census” of all the ROSCAs that could be
identiﬁed around a given set of market places in one administrative division of Western
Kenya. For each ROSCA in the census, we administered a baseline survey to identify the
size of the ROSCA, the contribution frequency, the services the ROSCA provided, and the
list of members. ROSCAs that did not have a regular meeting schedule or that met daily
9were not eligible for the study (because these types of ROSCAs were usually for very short-
term savings among market vendors). A total of 143 eligible ROSCAs were identiﬁed in this
manner.
These 143 ROSCAs were randomized into 5 groups: one control and four treatment
groups corresponding to the four experimental treatments described above. The randomiza-
tion was done after stratifying on three ROSCA characteristics (gender composition, meeting
frequency, and whether the ROSCA provided loans to its members).
3.2 Baseline ROSCA Information
We were not able to enroll all 143 ROSCAs in the study. By the time we attempted to meet
with ROSCAs to conduct the baseline (between August and October 2008), 11 ROSCAs
(7.7%) had been discontinued, and 19 (13.3%) others were not interested in the program.
This left us with 113 ROSCAs in the ﬁnal sample. Appendix Table A1 provides character-
istics on these 113 ROSCAs. We present means by treatment groups, as well as p-values for
tests comparing means across treatment groups. Despite the fact that we lost 21% of the
ROSCAs after the random assignment, the groups appear relatively balanced, suggesting
that ROSCA attrition was orthogonal to the experimental treatment assignment (which is
to be expected since ROSCAs did not know anything about the treatment at the time they
attrited).
Though the characteristics of the ROSCAs themselves are not the focus of our paper,
several are of some interest. First, most members are women: 74% of ROSCA participants
are women, and 32% of ROSCAs have only female members. The average ROSCA in our
sample has 17 members, meets two to three times a month, and the average monthly con-
tribution is 393 Ksh (US $5.24). Also of note is that many ROSCAs provide other services,
besides the savings pot: 64% provide loans to members, and 54% have an insurance fund
(principally for funerals or, in some cases, illnesses which require hospitalization). Finally,
98% of ROSCAs use a ﬁxed, rather than a random order or a bidding process to allocate
the pot.
3.3 Oﬀer of Experimental Treatments
In each ROSCA that could be enrolled in the study, the assigned experimental treatment
(if any) was oﬀered to participants during a regular ROSCA meeting. During the meet-
ing, participants in all ROSCAs, including the control group, were given information about
preventative health products (examples included bednets, water chlorination products, and
ceramic water ﬁlters) and were encouraged to save towards investing in these products. Since
10the control group was given the exact same information and encouragement as the treatment
groups, any observed post-treatment diﬀerences in health investments across groups can and
should be interpreted as the impacts of the saving technologies introduced, rather than as
diﬀerences in encouragement. For this reason, the comparison group should be thought of as
an “Encouragement Group” rather than as a pure control which received no treatment what-
soever. In the four treatment groups, the savings devices were introduced and explained right
after the encouragement was provided. All ROSCA members were oﬀered the treatment (a
total of about 1,900 people in total across the four treatment groups).10
3.4 Baseline Data
A random subset of ROSCA members were sampled (using a random number table) for data
collection during the same meeting at which the encouragement and treatment oﬀer (when
applicable) were provided. In total, we enrolled 771 respondents into the surveys across all
113 participating ROSCAs. After obtaining consent, those respondents selected for data
collection were given a baseline survey.
The survey included modules on basic household demographics, time and risk preferences,
and health investments. Importantly, the survey also included questions on whether the
respondent had a health savings goal, what this goal was, how much money the respondent
needed to save to reach the goal, and how long the respondent thought it would take to
reach that goal. Likely because people had been primed to think about health from the
encouragement, most respondents reported having some type of health savings goal. In
fact, over half of respondents reported that their goal was one of the preventative health
products that were showcased during the encouragement talk (the most popular products
were bednets and water puriﬁcation products). The average value of the goal was relatively
large given average incomes (548 Ksh after trimming the top 1%, around $7.31 US), and
respondents estimated they needed 2.5 months on average to reach that goal (as we will see
below, this turns out to be an extremely overoptimistic estimate).
Note that in the treatment groups, goal elicitation took place after the experimental
saving technologies had been oﬀered. This means that the treatment could have aﬀected the
goal chosen by the respondents. We present results on how the goals varied by treatment
arms in Appendix Table A2. Overall, we see some diﬀerences between the groups, though
they are relatively minor. Given that these diﬀerences are potentially endogenous, however,
we consider the reaching of one’s speciﬁc goal as supportive evidence, rather than the main
10Note that this means that, even for the individual devices (the Safe Box, the Lockbox, or the HSA), the
oﬀer was made in the presence of others and each participant’s decision to take-up the oﬀer was public (just
as the decision to participate in the Health Pot had to be public by nature).
11outcome of interest. To estimate impacts, we instead focus on overall health investments
and savings, measured through detailed follow-up surveys.11
3.5 Follow-up Data
We conducted two follow-up surveys, a midline after 6 months and an endline after 1 year,
both of which included modules similar to those administered at baseline. For respondents
in the treatment groups, treatment-speciﬁc modules were administered in addition to the
general survey. In particular, respondents in the Safe Box and Lockbox groups were asked to
produce their box. In the Safe Box group, respondents were asked to open the box so that
the enumerator could record the amount that was in it. In the Lockbox group, enumerators
brought the key with them for the survey; they opened the box, counted the money and
then closed the box again. They then oﬀered the respondent the option to keep the key.
If the respondent refused the key, the enumerator brought the key back to the oﬃce. For
respondents in the HSA group, the treasurer’s records of all deposits and withdrawals were
copied.
Close to 95% of the sample could be interviewed for the 6-month follow-up, and 92% could
be interviewed for the 12-month follow-up. Attrition was not diﬀerential across experimental
arms, either at 6 or 12 months (see Appendix Table A3).
3.6 Final Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents baseline characteristics for the ﬁnal sample available for the analysis. Col-
umn 1 presents the sample mean and standard deviation for a series of characteristics. To
test for balance across groups, columns 2-5 present the coeﬃcient estimates (and standard
errors) of the diﬀerence, for each group, between the baseline mean in the treatment group
and the mean in the control group. Since randomization was done at the ROSCA level, the
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at that level. Column 6 presents the p-value for
an F-test of the equality of means across all ﬁve groups.
A few characteristics of the sample are worth mentioning. First, since our sample is
representative of ROSCA participants, it is heavily female (74%). Second, the great majority
of respondents are married (75% of women and 88% of men). Respondents are around 39
years old, and have close to 4 children on average. Education levels are relatively low (average
years of education is just 6.3, much less than the 8 needed to complete primary school). The
sample is also quite poor. Less than a quarter of people have a cement ﬂoor in the house
11We also tested whether knowing one’s experimental treatment status aﬀected the time and risk prefer-
ences we measured in the baseline survey. We ﬁnd no evidence that it did (see Table 1).
12(i.e, they have a dirt ﬂoor), and average weekly income reported by respondents is around
600 Ksh (US $8). We do not have data on spousal income, but given the large number of
dependents, it is likely that income for the average household in our sample is below the $1
per person per day extreme poverty threshold. Health investments are relatively low – the
average respondent owns just ovet 1.5 bednets for a household size of 5 or more, and only
about half of respondents report using chlorine to treat their water. Consequently, health
is also very poor. Respondents reported that 34% of their children under 5 had malaria in
the month preceding the baseline survey, and 20% of respondents reported having malaria
in that month themselves.12
In terms of time preferences, only about 19% of people are what we call “somewhat
patient” (i.e. prefer 55 Ksh or less in 1 month to 40 Ksh now). About 16% of respondents
are present-biased.13 Surprisingly, about 18% appear to be more patient in the present than
in the future.14 Finally, a large fraction of respondents (45%) exhibits extreme impatience
in both present and future.
Turning to the diﬀerences across groups in columns 2-5, the groups appear well-balanced
overall, with no more signiﬁcant diﬀerences than should be expected. There are 21 dependent
variables, and therefore 21 × 4 = 84 coeﬃcients estimated in Table 1. Only 5, 3 and 0
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Note that some respondents belonged to two or more ROSCAs enrolled in the study. Thus
some respondents (9% of the sample) were exposed to more than one experimental treatment.
While the likelihood of being exposed to more than one treatment is not exogenous (it
depends on the number of ROSCAs one participates in), the combination of treatments one
is exposed to, holding constant the number of ROSCAs, is exogenous. For this reason, we
include a dummy for being exposed to more than one treatment as a control in the regression
analysis below.
Before turning to the results, we want to note that our sample is not representative of
the entire population, but instead is representative only of the roughly 40% of people who
12These are likely overestimates since malaria is typically self-diagnosed and households tend to call
“malaria” any illness episodes with fever (Cohen et al. 2011). However, self-reported malaria episodes are
still relatively severe sicknesses.
13For measures of time consistency, we assign people to one of four categories: (1) “present-biased”
individuals who exhibit a higher discount rate in the present than in the future; (2) respondents who exhibit
maximum possible discount rates in both the present and future (these individuals preferred 40 Ksh to 500
Ksh in 1 month, and 40 Ksh in 1 month to 500 Ksh in 2 months); (3) respondents who are more patient in
the future than in the present; and (4) “time-consistent” individuals who have the same discount rate in the
present and the future.
14Though this seems counter-intuitive, previous studies have found similar results: about 10% of respon-
dents from India in Bauer et al. (2010) and 15% of respondents from the Philippines in Ashraf et al. (2006a)
had preferences of this type. We also found similar levels in a previous study in the same area of study
(Dupas and Robinson 2009).
13participate in ROSCAs. In Appendix A1, we present descriptive evidence of selection into
ROSCAs. ROSCA participants are slightly richer and more educated than average, and are
more likely to be women. More fundamentally, our sample includes only individuals who
already self-selected into participating into a savings club, which means that we are looking
at a group of people who potentially have a higher propensity or desire to save than average.
The fact that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant barriers to savings among this group suggests that the rest
of the population might be having even more diﬃculty saving, but we cannot test that in
this study. We leave this for future work, but to ﬁx ideas, Appendix A2 ventures a few
hypotheses as to how the savings devices that we identify as eﬀective in our sample would
likely aﬀect non-ROSCA participants.
4 Results: Take-up
Table 2 presents summary statistics on take-up of each of the four experimental devices. As
mentioned above, take-up was measured for the full sample at two points in time, 6 and 12
months after the introduction of the experimental treatments.15
Overall take-up was very high for all four devices. At the 6-month mark, 74% of those
sampled for a Safe Box and 69% of those sampled for a Lockbox had a positive amount of
cash in their box at the time of the (unannounced) survey. These ﬁgures had barely changed
by the 12-month follow-up: 71% of the Safe Box group and 66% of the Lockbox group still
had positive amounts in their box. For the ROSCA-level interventions, take-up was equally
high. About 65% of respondents had elected to participate in a Health Pot with fellow
ROSCA members at the 6-month follow-up, and this ﬁgure had increased to 71% after one
year.16 Take-up of the HSAs was even higher: 93% of respondents elected to create an HSA
within 6 months and 97% created one within 12 months. The high take-up rates for both
the Health Pot and the HSA are quite striking given the fact that they both required some
level of cooperation between ROSCA members. For the Health Pot, members had to agree
on a speciﬁc health product that everybody wanted. For the HSA, members had to trust
the treasurer.
15Our take-up analysis is limited by the fact that we do not observe total deposits. For the Safe Box
and the Lockbox treatments, we only observe savings balances when the boxes were opened at follow-up.
We attempted to collect information on total deposits by asking respondents to show us the passbooks they
had been given along with the boxes, but most respondents did not keep their passbook up to date. For the
Health Pot treatment, we also do not have good measures of actual contribution amounts, since those were
collected at the ROSCA and the ROSCA records were spotty.
16Note that the adoption at the ROSCA level is slightly higher, with 19 out of 23 ROSCAs in the Health
Pot group starting a health pot, or 82%. Not all ROSCA members elected to participate in the scheme,
however, so the take-up ﬁgure at the individual level is lower.
14While take-up of the Lockbox was almost as high as that of the Safe Box, the intensity
of usage was signiﬁcantly higher for the Safe Box. Among those with a positive balance in
their Safe Box, average balances were 634 Ksh (US$ 8.4) after 6 months and 311 Ksh (US$
4.1) after 12 months. Since these are total balances, not deposits, they are lower bounds on
amounts saved. The lower balance (and lower variance) after 12 months suggests that most
respondents withdrew money from the box to make a purchase between the ﬁrst and second
follow-ups. Amounts saved in the Lockbox were also relatively large, but lower than those
observed in Safe Box. While the median balance in the Lockbox was comparable to that of
the Safe Box group at both 6 and 12 months, the average balance was about half that of the
Safe Box after six months. The average balance in the Lockbox had increased to 570 Ksh at
12 months. For the majority of lockbox users, this represents not only the current balance
but also the total ever deposited, since they never called the program oﬃcer to withdraw
from the box. Indeed, as Panel B shows, only 18% of respondents had called the program
oﬃcer and asked for their box to get opened within the ﬁrst 6 months. This had increased
to 31% by 12 months. Overall, while the Lockbox appears to be dominated by the Safe Box,
the data suggests that the Lockbox was still better than nothing, and that people would have
eventually saved up signiﬁcant sums if given enough time.
The median and mean balance among those who opened an HSA reached 90 and 189
Ksh (US$ 2.5) after 12 months, respectively. These ﬁgures are somewhat lower than those
observed for the boxes.17
Panels B, C and D provide additional details on how respondents used the four devices.
To start, Panel B suggests that the demand for the earmarking feature (the unavailability
of the key) remained very high over time. After 6 months, lockbox owners were asked: “Do
you want the key now, or do you want me to hold on to the key?” Of the 88% who still
had the box after 6 months, the majority (75%) requested that the program oﬃcer hold the
key. At 12 months, when the program ended and the program oﬃcer handed the key to the
participants, about 12% asked if it was possible to extend the program and for the oﬃcer to
keep the key (unfortunately this was not possible for budgetary reasons). Thus, even though
the Safe Box had the larger impact on health investments (as we will show below), some
individuals seemed to have valued the earmarking that the Lockbox aﬀorded.18 For both box
groups, secrecy (at least from the spouse) was not a major reason for usage. After 6 months,
17For both boxes and the HSA, the balances observed are relatively small compared to average monthly
ROSCA contributions, which are around 393 Ksh per month (see Appendix Table A1). However, since the
median balance is always lower than the mean, some people used these technologies very intensively.
18This could be due to status quo bias. Ideally, to quantify the importance of the status quo bias, we
would have asked Safe Box holders if they were interested in letting the research team hold the key for them.
We did not oﬀer them that option, but we note that at the follow-up only 4% of Safe Box holders reported
storing the key with someone else, suggesting that the status quo bias is likely large.
1578% of Safe Box spouses and 79% of Lockbox spouses knew about the box. This increased
to over 90% after 1 year.
Panel C shows that the ROSCAs that formed a Health Pot for the most part enforced the
earmarking feature: the majority of health pot recipients were either given the pot in-kind
(i.e. they received the agreed upon health product rather than the cash equivalent), or were
accompanied to the shop to buy the product.
Finally, Panel D, based on records kept by ROSCA treasurers in the HSA group, shows
that participants made a substantial number of small deposits into their HSA.
It is possible that the money put into these various devices displaced other types of
savings. Some of the evidence we show in section 7.3 suggests it might have. In particular,
the boxes appear to have somewhat crowded-out ROSCA savings in the long run. On the
other hand, the amount households reported spending on durables or on animals were, if
anything, higher in the treatment groups than the control group over the study period (data
not shown). In any case, even if there were crowding out, the take-up results suggest that
the savings devices we consider here are preferred to the alternative people had been using.
5 Results: Impacts on Health Investments
5.1 Average Impacts
We study the average impact of each of the four experimental treatments by running the
following regression:






id + ei (1)
where Yi is a measure of health savings/investments for individual i, Ti is a vector of
treatment dummies, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (age, gender, marital status,
time preferences, and a dummy for being exposed to more than one experimental treatment).
Ri is a vector of randomization strata dummies. For both outcomes, we estimate equation
(1) both with and without the individual controls.
We consider three measures of health savings/investments: (1) how much the individual
spent on preventative health products in the year between the baseline and endline; (2)
whether the individual had to forgo medical treatment over the past three months for herself
or a family member due to lack of cash; and (3) whether the respondent reached her baseline
saving goal.19
19As can be seen in Appendix Table A2, most respondents reported a preventative health product as a
goal, but about 16% listed “savings for emergencies” as a goal. In the case of the preventative products, we
deﬁne a respondent as having reached her goal if she purchased that item. For emergency savings, we do
16Estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 3. We focus on the results at the 12-
month follow-up because it took that long to generate substantial impacts.20 Columns 1
and 2 present the results for preventative investments, Columns 3 and 4 present the results
inability to deal with health emergencies, and Columns 5 and 6 present the goal-reaching
results. Regressions without individual controls are shown in the odd numbered columns
while those with the controls are in the even numbered columns. The mean and standard
deviation of the dependent variable for the control group are presented in each column under
the R-squared of the regression.
Columns 1 and 2 show that both the Safe Box and the Health Pot had signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects on levels of preventative health investments in the 12 months following their intro-
duction. Compared to the control mean, the eﬀects are very large: the Safe Box increased
investment by about 68% while the Health Pot increased investment by about 129%.21 By
contrast, the HSA treatment had no eﬀect on investment, which is not surprising in that it
was to be used for saving for health emergencies only.
Interestingly, the Lockbox had no eﬀect on investment over the year following its intro-
duction. This suggests that the liquidity cost of holding money in the Lockbox outweighed
the beneﬁt of earmarking for the average individual. While the take-up results shown in
Table 2 indicated that people did save in the Lockbox so that it is likely that it would have
enabled them to increase preventative health investment if given more time, what is striking
is that the Lockbox was ineﬀective over a year, while the Safe Box was highly eﬀective.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the HSA, which was designed mostly to encourage people to
build savings to deal with shocks, signiﬁcantly reduced the likelihood that people would be
unable to aﬀord medical care. Again, the eﬀect is extremely large: people in the HSA group
were 12 percentage points less likely to be unable to aﬀord treatment, on a base of 31% in
the control group (column 4).22 The Safe Box also appeared to be helpful, but the eﬀects
not have a very good estimate of whether people could reach their goal. While we can observe the amount
of emergency savings in the HSA and compare that to the listed goal for those in the HSA group, we do not
have a comparable measure for those in the control group. Instead, for all groups, we deﬁne a respondent as
reaching her health emergency savings goal if she reports having no diﬃculty paying for medical treatment
in the past three months. For these 16% of the sample, the likelihood of reaching one’s goal is more than
double that of those with a preventative investment goal.
20After 6 months, the eﬀects have the expected sign but none of them are large, nor signiﬁcant, which is
not surprising since the amounts needed for the goals were quite large, as shown in Table A2.
21Note that these increases are not driven by just a few large purchases by a small subsample. While the
median and mean amounts spent on preventative health products are, respectively, 105 and 207 Ksh in the
control group, they both increase substantially in the treatment groups: the median and mean are 235 and
407 Ksh in the Safe Box group, and 335 and 563 Ksh in the Health Pot group.
22This eﬀect size appears reasonable. Recall from Table 2, Panel D, that the total deposits recorded in
the HSAs at the time of the unannounced 12-month follow-up was about 200 Ksh on average. We asked
those people who couldn’t aﬀord full treatment how much they would have needed to do so. In the control
group, 200 Ksh corresponded to the 32nd percentile of answers listed. This suggests that the HSA could
17are not statistically signiﬁcant. As expected, the Health Pot and Lockbox had minimal eﬀect
since they were not designed for this type of saving.
The last two columns in Table 3 show how the experimental treatments aﬀected the
likelihood that people reached their baseline health goal. While only 34 percent of those in
the control group had reached their goal after 12 months, this probability increased by 13
percentage points in both the Safe Box and the Health Pot groups (column 6). Of course, as
discussed earlier, these results should be taken with a grain of salt since people chose their
goals after having received the savings technology, and therefore the goals chosen varied
somewhat with the technology received (though not too much, as shown in Table A2).
With these estimates, we can attribute the impacts of the experimental saving technolo-
gies to one of the three distinct set of attributes: Storage (S), Earmarking (E) and Social
Credit + Commitment (C). As discussed in Section 2, the relationship between estimates of
impacts on preventative health investments and attributes can be summarized as follows:
P1 = S
P2 = S + Ep
P3 = S + Ep + C
where P1, P2 and P3 are the increase in preventative health investments due to the Safe
Box, the Lockbox and the Health Pot, respectively.
From Table 3, Column 2, the Safe Box increased investment by 173 Ksh, the Lockbox
by 50 Ksh, and the Health Pot by 332 Ksh. Thus, we estimate that simply having access
to a safe storage place for money (S) accounts for an additional 175 Ksh in investment.
Earmarking for preventative health (Ep) is negatively valued at 50−175 = −125 Ksh. This
implies that the liquidity cost of earmarking discourages investment on average, compared to
a storage technology without earmarking. Finally, social commitment and credit (C) have
the largest impact, estimated at 332−50 = 282 Ksh. The standard errors on these estimates
are presented at the bottom of Table 3.
5.2 Heterogeneity
This section tests for heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects based on observable characteris-
tics. We run the following set of regressions:









iδ + εi (2)
reduce inability to aﬀord full treatment by about one third. The actual eﬀect is a bit higher than this (39%
in the speciﬁcations with individual controls), but the conﬁdence interval includes 32%.
18where TRAITi is the vector of background characteristics along which theory predicts
heterogeneity in the impact of the experimental treatments (note that the elements in
TRAITi are included in the vector Xi). The eﬀect of the treatment for the subgroup of
people with a given trait is thus the sum of the coeﬃcients β + γ for that trait.
We estimate equation 2 with three traits based on our ex-ante hypotheses as to what
savings barriers are most important, as discussed in Section 2.3. These are (1) whether
the individual supports other members of the community (this is a dummy equal to 1 if an
individual reported giving money to at least one friend or relative in the three months prior
to the baseline survey, but did not report receiving any money from a friend or relative over
that same period); (2) whether the individual exhibits present-biased preferences in survey
questions; and (3) whether the individual is married. For this latter trait, we must restrict
the analysis to women only, since there are very few unmarried men in our sample (only 25).
The results are presented in Tables 4 (preventative investments) and 5 (ability to cope
with emergencies). We show four speciﬁcations in each table, two with the full sample
(without and with controls), and two restricted to women only (again, without and with
controls). In the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations with the full sample, we include only “provider”
and “present-bias” dummies in our vector of traits. In the speciﬁcations for women, we add
“married” in the vector of traits. The estimates and the p-values for the sums β +γ, i.e. the
total estimated impacts for those exhibiting a given “trait”, are presented in the column on
the immediate right of the regression results.
Preventative Investment The results on preventative health investments presented in
Table 4 suggest substantial heterogeneity in impacts along the three traits considered. First,
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, positive interaction between “provider” and “lockbox”. This suggests
that providers are more willing to pay the liquidity cost of earmarking than non-providers
(likely because having liquidity is less valuable for them since the money would be given away
anyway). Similarly, while social commitment and credit are valuable even for non-providers,
this bundle of features appear to be even more valued by providers.
People who are not present-biased beneﬁt from the Safe Box, but not from the Lockbox.
This result suggests that people who do not need strong commitment are reluctant to tie up
money in the Lockbox because earmarking has little value for them, and so the liquidity cost
dominates. By contrast, those exhibiting present-bias are not able to beneﬁt from the simple
storage place oﬀered by the Safe Box, since the money is too easily accessible. Interestingly,
they also do not beneﬁt from the individual earmarking feature oﬀered by the Lockbox,
which suggests that they are naive about their present-bias or that they need commitment
to actively save in the device. And indeed, they do beneﬁt from the combination of the
19stronger commitment to make regular contributions and credit provided by the Health Pot.
Finally, the analysis on the female sample in columns 5 to 8 suggests that intra-household
issues might be important, but the results are unclear: on one hand, married women seem to
beneﬁt from the Safe Box and the Lockbox more than unmarried women, but on the other
hand they beneﬁt less from the Health Pot. None of these diﬀerences between married and
unmarried women are statistically signiﬁcant, however.
Coping with Emergencies Table 5 presents the results on treatment eﬀects heterogeneity
for the technologies used for emergency savings (the Safe Box and HSA). Note that the
dependent variable here is not having enough money to aﬀord full treatment, so that negative
coeﬃcients imply that the experimental technologies were eﬀective. We ﬁnd that the eﬀects
of both the Safe Box and the HSA are larger for providers than non-providers, larger for
those do not exhibit present-bias than for those who do, and larger for married women than
unmarried women. While these diﬀerences are not always statistically signiﬁcant, they are
all in line with the predictions discussed in section 2.3.
Finally, we note that across the entire sample, earmarking is much more valuable here
than it was for preventative investment (which can be seen by comparing the overall Lockbox
eﬀect in Table 4 to the overall HSA eﬀect in Table 5). This result suggests that people in
our sample value earmarking for emergency health savings (a ﬁrst order concern to many
households) more than for preventative health.
Discussion A possible concern with the heterogeneity analysisis that the various “traits”
we study (being a provider, present-biased or married) are not randomly assigned. These
could be correlated with other characteristics. While we cannot entirely rule out that the het-
erogeneous treatment eﬀects we observe are due to some unobservable heterogeneity in other
traits correlated with those we focus on, we take comfort in the fact that the heterogene-
ity in treatment eﬀects along the three traits we had pre-speciﬁed matches the underlying
theoretical framework presented in Section 2.3.23, 24
23The results are mostly robust to the inclusion of interactions between the experimental treatments
and other observable characteristics such as income. Inclusion of these control interactions is problematic,
however, since they are likely endogenous.
24Appendix Table A4 tests how take-up of each savings technology varies along the three traits of interest.
Those ﬁgures must be taken with caution since the sample size for each regression is small (and the standard
errors are large), and our measures of take-up are only weak measures of actual usage (especially for the box
groups, since we only know the balance that was in the box at follow-up and not the total amount saved).
The results are nevertheless supportive of our other results. Providers saved more in the lockbox and in the
Health Pot, and those exhibiting present-bias saved less in the Safe Box.
206 Long-Run Results
The discussion to this point has focused on impacts in the year following the intervention.
Given the large impacts observed, an important question is whether respondents continued
using these savings devices in the long run, and whether the devices we introduced spread
to non-treatment ROSCAs.
To answer these questions, we conducted a long-term follow-up in May 2011, almost
three years (33 months) after the rollout of the savings devices in the treatment arms. We
randomly selected a subset of 359 study participants, and successfully followed up with 310
of them (86 percent). In the interview, we updated information on the status of the ROSCAs
and on whether respondents were using the savings products. Perhaps most importantly,
the survey included a number of open-ended questions to better understand why people were
using the various savings products and what they thought of them. In this section, we review
the ﬁndings of that longer-term follow-up.25
6.1 Long-Run Usage
The longer run take-up results are presented in Table 6. We combine the two box groups
(Safe Box and Lockbox) into one (called Box), since the key was given to all lockbox holders
at either the 6- or the 12-month follow-up survey, thereby transforming the Lockbox into a
Safe Box.
Usage of the boxes is still substantial after almost 3 years: 39% of people are still saving
in their box, and for those, the average amount of cash found in the box at the time of
the survey was above 700 Ksh. Most of the people still saving in their box reported saving
towards a speciﬁc goal (83%). The majority of them have maintained at least one health
goal (63%), but people often reported saving towards a multiplicity of goals, including for
their business, or schools fees.
In addition to observing the amount present in the box at the time of the survey, the
enumerator asked respondents how much they had deposited in total over the past 33 months.
Since most people had not kept records of how much they had been using the box, we allowed
people to answer qualitatively if they were unable to estimate: i.e. “a lot,” “a little,” etc.
Overall, 32% of people with a box could give a numerical answer about their total deposits.
25We present evidence in Appendix Table A5 that the sample surveyed in the long-term followup is
representative of the initial sample. As we focus on usage and take-up, the key question is whether those
in the long-term followup were using the technologies similarly to the entire sample in earlier follow-ups.
Reassuringly, we ﬁnd that the patterns of take-up and usage of the four experimental saving technologies at
the 12-month follow-up are statistically indistinguishable between those in the long-term followup and the
entire sample.
21For these people, the average amount deposited is very high, at 3,369 Ksh. An additional
21% report depositing “a lot.”
We ﬁnd strong evidence of lasting impacts in the two other treatment groups as well: 48%
of people are still participating in the Health Pot and 53% in the Health Savings Account. Of
those still saving in an HSA, 73% had made a withdrawal, and the majority of withdrawals
continue to be for health emergencies.
6.2 Diﬀusion
The long-run usage results suggest that the program had a lasting eﬀect on the savings
behavior for many individuals. If these technologies are meeting an unmet demand for secure
savings and are indeed beneﬁcial for people, then it seems possible that the technologies
diﬀused to non-treatment ROSCAs.
To test for the presence of such diﬀusion, in the long-run follow up we asked each ROSCA
whether it had adopted a Health Pot or HSA scheme. The results are presented in Table
7. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with diﬀusion: at the 3-year follow-up, 11 percent of control
group ROSCAs had adopted the Health Pot scheme, and 22 percent had adopted the HSA
scheme. In other words, out of 18 ROSCAs in the control group, 2 adopted the Health Pot
scheme and 4 adopted the HSA scheme. Adoption of these schemes in the Safe Box and
Lockbox group was lower, with only one or two ROSCAs adopting these schemes. The lower
adoption ﬁgures in the box groups is due in part to the fact that those ROSCAs in those
groups were more likely to dissolve, as we will see in section 7.3. In any case, the results in
Table 7 suggest non-trivial adoption of the Health Pot and HSA saving strategies in the study
area. These adoption rates are unlikely to reﬂect a general trend among local ROSCAs that
would have pre-existed our study, since the technologies we introduced simply did not exist
beforehand. The diﬀusion we observe is therefore almost certainly due to the treatments we
implemented.26
26The ideal way to study diﬀusion would be to examine whether technologies diﬀused to ROSCAs which
were geographically close or which had strong social ties to treatment ROSCAs. We are unable to do this,
however, because we only interviewed a subsample of people in each ROSCA, and so do not have the full set
of links between ROSCAs. We are similarly unable to exploit geographic location in that we do not have
GIS coordinates for ROSCAs.
227 Mechanisms
7.1 Mental Accounting
Our most striking result is that getting access to a safe and designated storage technology
as simple as a safe box can have large and lasting impacts on health savings and investment
behavior. How is this possible? All the Safe Box provided is some protection against
theft, but in focus groups conducted before starting the study, theft did not seem to be
a primary concern for people. What then accounts for the large impact of the Safe Box?
This section presents evidence from open-ended survey questions that we administered to
our study participants throughout the study period. All in all, the data strongly suggests
that the box served a sort of mental accounting purpose: once money was put into the box,
it was mentally allocated towards savings, which made it easier to refuse requests or limit
spending.
During the long-run follow-up, we asked respondents, in an open-ended way, why they
felt that the box was helpful. We then coded their answers into 7 diﬀerent categories. The
results are presented in Panel A of Table 8. Thirty-three percent said it made it easier to
save small change; 32% said that the box helped because the money in the box was not on
hand, or “out of sight”; and 19% said it helped them to reduce spending on luxury items (an
example of such an item is ready-made food bought on the market, like chips). By contrast,
only 6% said the box helped because it reduced theft, and only 2% said it was because the
box was secure in a secret place that others didn’t know about.
Panel B of Table 8 presents answers to questions about obligations to share money with
others. In the endline conducted after one year, we asked people how much they agreed with
the following statement: “If somebody comes to ask me for money and I have the money in
cash, I am obligated to give her something.” Respondents answered on a scale of 1 to 5 where
1 indicated that they “strongly agreed” and 5 was “strongly disagreed.” Thus a response
less than 3 indicates agreement with the statement. Overall, respondents agree that there is
pressure to share: across the entire sample, the average response to this question was 2.35.
We then asked the Safe Box group the same question, but this time for the case in which
the money was in the box. While the average Safe Box group had a similar response to the
cash question as the whole sample (their average was 2.70), they felt much less obligated to
share when the money was in the box (the average was 4.30).
In the longer-term follow-up, we asked a similar question to both box groups: “If some-
body comes to ask for money, is it easier to say no if the money is in the box?” We asked
about requests from a hypothetical person outside the household, as well as requests from
the spouse (for married respondents). Eighty-one percent of respondents reported that the
23box helps say no to people outside the household, and 43% reported that it helps say no to
the spouse (despite the fact that the vast majority of spouses knew about the box, as shown
in Tables 2 and 6). Thus, part of the explanation for why the Safe Box had such a large
impact appears to be because it made it easier to say no to money requests from others.
The question then becomes: why does the box make it easier to say no? Why don’t people
just open up the box to give people the money they ask for? In the long-run follow-up, we
directly asked people why they thought it was easier to say no to requests for money. A
sizeable fraction (51%) report that this is because the money in the box is for a speciﬁc goal
(which we interpret to mean that the money in the box is mentally allocated to savings). Of
the remainder, 24% say that others don’t know about the box; 9% say it can’t be accessed
immediately because it’s kept elsewhere; and 5% say that it’s not easily accessed because
it’s hidden (the remainder report various other reasons).
While this evidence seems quite compelling, another way to check whether this mental
accounting eﬀect is indeed the mechanism through which the Safe Box mattered would be to
look directly at expenditures, and test whether people in the Safe Box group reduced spend-
ing on treats and transfers to friends/relatives. We cannot do this since we did not attempt to
collect such outcomes. Collecting data with enough granularity to observe small decreases in
daily spending would have been extremely diﬃcult without detailed high-frequency surveys,
which were not feasible in this case.
7.2 Ruling out Alternative Explanations
We can also use the answers observed in our qualitative survey questions to address some
possible alternative explanations for our ﬁndings. One set of possible concerns is that the
experimental treatments oﬀered a fuller set of attributes than we have focused on so far.
In particular, one could question whether the large Safe Box and HSA eﬀects (and the
high take-up of the Lockbox, even if it did not translate into an impact on health investments
within the study period) would have been observed if these saving technologies had been
oﬀered to individuals independently of the ROSCA structure. In other words, how much of
the eﬀects come from the fact that the randomization was done at the ROSCA level, and the
delivery of the boxes happened at a group meeting, where everyone could see others receive
a box and set a goal?
There are four main channels through which this could matter. First, given that deposits
onto the HSA were typically made during regular ROSCA meetings, those meetings might
have acted as “reminders” to save in the HSA. Likewise, if people discussed their progress
with their box savings at ROSCA meetings, this could have had an independent eﬀect. For
24example, Kast et al. (2011) ﬁnd evidence that such self-help group meetings can increase
saving rates through a reminder eﬀect. While we cannot rule out this possibility, we want
to point out that those in the control group also had frequent ROSCA meetings that could
have acted as reminders to save for health. What’s more, the eﬀects we observe are an order
of magnitude larger than those observed in Kast et al. (2011).
Second, given that deposits onto HSA accounts were made at ROSCA meetings, it may
be the case that people observed what others were doing (especially how much people were
saving) and that this inﬂuenced behavior directly. For example, if some members of the
ROSCA are also part of one’s informal insurance network, people might be less willing to
help others if they can see they are not saving enough on their own in their HSA. To test for
this, we asked respondents in the HSA group whether they knew how much other ROSCA
members were saving in their HSA. We present the results in Panel C of Table 8. We ﬁnd
that 23% knew how much every other ROSCA member was saving and 53% knew about
the savings of at least some of them. Only 14% reported that others’ behavior inﬂuence
their savings, however. This suggests that social pressure likely played a minor role in the
eﬀectiveness of the HSA.
Third, one could be concerned that ROSCAs oﬀer some features (such as insurance
funds or credit) that could have interacted with our treatment eﬀects. We do not ﬁnd much
heterogeneity in treatment impacts by baseline ROSCA characteristics, however (data not
shown).
Finally, the fact that the experimental treatments were introduced in groups could matter
if there are large complementarities in health behavior (for example, if the private returns to
investing in a given health product are low unless everyone else also invests in that product).
None of the health products that were chosen seem to have that property, however. In fact, if
anything, we would expect the opposite eﬀect: many of the products chosen as goals generate
positive health externalities, and thus free-riding should have been optimal. In other words,
even if study participants knew about the social returns (which we do not think is the case,
based on results in Dupas (2010)), this would bias our results downwards, as the private
returns to a given product would be highest in the control group.
7.3 Epilogue: Long-run Impacts on ROSCA survival
This last section examines how ROSCA participation was aﬀected by the introduction of the
individual saving technologies (the Safe Box and Lockbox). Understanding the motivation
to join a ROSCA has been the subject of a rich theoretical and empirical literature. Besley
et al. (1993) argue that ROSCAs enable individuals to acquire indivisible goods faster
25than through individual saving. More recent papers have put the emphasis on ROSCAs
oﬀering a commitment function for individuals to overcome inconsistencies in preferences
across household members (Anderson and Baland 2002) or across time periods (Gugerty
2007). In addition to the question of why they exist in the ﬁrst place, the organization of
ROSCAs raises a second fundamental question: why don’t those people who get the pot
early in the cycle quit the ROSCA? Besley et al. (1993) argue that in the absence of cheaper
forms of credit, ROSCAs can exist if defaulters face the threat of being barred from entering
any ROSCA in the future, and Anderson et al. (2009) show that this threat works better
in ﬁxed-order roscas (such as those in our study sample) than in random-order roscas. In
contrast, Basu (2008) shows that if ROSCAs are composed of people with quasi-hyperbolic
time preferences, ROSCAs can survive even if social sanctions are absent.
Our experimental setting lends itself well to studying the question of why ROSCAs exist
and how they survive. Indeed, by randomizing access to individual saving strategies (the
Safe Box and the Lockbox), we created exogenous variation in the “autarkic” option. By
testing how these changes in the autarkic option aﬀect ROSCA survival, we can test some
of the explanations proposed in the earlier literature.
We collected data on ROSCA survival as part of the long-term follow-up. In Table 9, we
regress the likelihood that the ROSCA has been discontinued on the various experimental
treatment arms. We ﬁnd a very strong eﬀect of the individual saving boxes on ROSCA
exit: while the exit rate was only 6 percent over the 33-month study period among ROSCAs
where no individual saving strategy was introduced, the exit rate was 23-29 percentage points
higher among ROSCAs where saving boxes were distributed.27
What do these results imply for our understanding of ROSCAs in the study context?
While the box did not oﬀer any form of strong commitment, it helped individuals to over-
come both inter-personal and intra-personal saving barriers through a mental accounting
eﬀect. This appears to have reduced the incentive to participate in ROSCAs and suggests
that, while the credit motive is an important reason to join ROSCAs (as evidenced by the
very large eﬀects of the Health Pot on savings for health), it does not fully explain ROSCA
participation. Our results also suggest that the form of commitment that ROSCAs of-
fer might be somewhat stronger than what the majority of individuals need. None of the
ROSCAs in our sample allocate the pot through a bidding process, so that savings are not
available for emergencies. In the absence of softer-commitment alternatives, people may
choose to participate in ROSCAs even if the liquidity restriction is a major cost for them.
27This data was collected after several cycles would have been completed, so the discontinuation of a
ROSCA is not equivalent to the “collapse” of a group mid-cycle in which some people might lose money.
Also note that if we perform the analysis at the individual member level, we ﬁnd the exact same pattern of
results.
26But when better individual saving strategies are introduced, the appeal of ROSCAs appears
to somewhat diminish.28
8 Conclusion
In both developed and developing countries, many people have diﬃculty saving as much as
they would like. But while households in developed countries have access to many products
to help them surmount their saving diﬃculties (certiﬁcates of deposits, automatic transfers
to 401(k)s, HSAs, etc.), households in developing countries tend to rely on much more
informal arrangements (Collins et al. 2009; Rutherford 2000). This paper suggests that
existing informal mechanisms in rural Kenya are insuﬃcient – introducing a technology as
basic as a simple box with a lock and key allows the average individual to substantially
increase her investment in preventative health and to reduce her household’s vulnerability
to health shocks. We present evidence that the mechanism through which this simple safe
box enables savings is through a mental accounting purpose. The money put into the box
was seen by respondents as “for savings” and was therefore less likely to be spent on luxuries
or given away to others. Usage of the box remained high for (at least) 33 months after it
was introduced.
Such a simple technology is not valuable for everybody, however. In particular, mental
accounting appears insuﬃcient to enable individuals with present-biased preferences to save
more. For them, an individual commitment savings account or lockbox is not eﬀective either,
however. While present-biased people may realize the need to commit money to savings and
be interested in a commitment device, actually putting money into the lockbox itself requires
an act of self-control, as discussed in Ashraf et al. (2006a) and Banerjee and Duﬂo (2011).
Thus, in the same way that people in the US buy gym memberships but subsequently fail
to exercise enough to amortize the cost (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006), people who are
present-biased may sign up for a commitment savings account but never deposit a single
penny in it, unless they can precommit to a direct deposit (as in Thaler and Benartzi (2004)
or Brune et al. (2011)) or unless they face social pressure. In our study, we ﬁnd that present-
biased individuals enthusiastically accepted the Lockbox, but failed to save much in it. In
contrast, the enthusiasm that led them to sign up for the Health Pot tied their hands not
only to spend the money a certain way, but also to continue to save on a regular basis (i.e., at
each ROSCA meeting). This strong social commitment feature is the only one that enabled
present-biased individuals in our sample to overcome their savings diﬃculties.
28Interestingly, the negative eﬀect of the Box treatment on ROSCA survival is concentrated among
ROSCAS that do not oﬀer loans to their members in addition to the regular pot (data not shown).
27Our sample frame was restricted to those already participating in ROSCAs at baseline.
While this sampling strategy means that our sample is not fully representative of the pop-
ulation of rural Kenya (since everybody in the sample had at least some ability to save to
start with), it is not too selected either since ROSCA participation is common in our area of
study, and ROSCA participation rates are even higher in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa
(Anderson and Baland 2002). Another piece of evidence which suggests that our results are
not speciﬁc to our sample is that they are generally consistent with previous research we
conducted in the same area of Kenya, in which we found that simple bank accounts had
substantial impacts on savings and investment levels for about 40 percent of women who run
a small vending business, but were not used by the remaining 60 percent of women vendors,
nor by men in the sample (mostly bicycle taxi drivers) (Dupas and Robinson 2009). Since
the bank accounts did not provide any form of earmarking or a strong commitment feature,
their primary function was likely to provide a designated place to save. The present study
suggests that more sophisticated devices that include stronger commitment features might
be better suited for some of those individuals who did not use the simple savings account.
For others, it appears that a less sophisticated but more easily accessible device such as a
Safe Box would be better suited to save small sums on a regular basis.
A key outstanding question is what these individual savings products would do to existing
social structures such as informal insurance networks. We ﬁnd evidence that getting access to
a safe box reduced ROSCA participation over time. Potentially, access to such a technology
could cause people to exit insurance networks entirely (Ligon et al. 2000). The only empirical
evidence to date on this issue comes from a lab experiment implemented with real social
networks in India by Chandrasekhar et al. (2011), who ﬁnd that access to individual saving
has only a small impact on informal risk sharing, and overall improves welfare as it allows
individuals to smooth consumption over risk that cannot be shared interpersonally. Future
research may usefully explore this issue outside the laboratory.
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31Table 1. Individual Level Summary Statistics and Balance Check
Demographic Characteristics Safe Box Lock Box Health Pot HSA 
Female 0.74 0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.29 771
(0.44) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Age 39.35 -4.99 -3.18 -4.32 -2.87 0.32 771
(13.12) (2.40)** (2.50) (2.36)* (2.51)
Married 0.78 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.59 771
(0.42) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Num. of Children 3.84 -0.14 -0.62 -0.29 -0.13 0.15 771
(2.38) (0.30) (0.28)** (0.33) (0.27)
Years of Education 6.27 -0.64 -0.42 1.06 -0.07 0.19 753
(3.81) (0.61) (0.64) (0.76) (0.56)
Can write in Swahili 0.73 -0.03 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.25 753
(0.44) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Cement floor at home 0.23 0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.04 0.24 750
(0.42) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Provider
1 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.13 771
(0.37) (0.05)** (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Weekly income (Ksh) 602 -9 -84 120 14 0.23 715
Health Status and Behavior
(589.52) (83.54) (73.86) (88.21) (73.51)
Prob. Children under 5 had malaria 0.34 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.85 398
        episode in past month (0.42) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Respondent had malaria 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.87 669
        in past month (0.40) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Treats drinking water with chlorine 0.52 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.74 669
(0.50) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Num. of bednets owned 1.69 -0.05 -0.39 0.05 -0.01 0.15 674
(1.55) (0.25) (0.22)* (0.31) (0.24)
Somewhat Patient 0.19 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.91 771
(0.39) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Present-biased 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.49 771
(0.37) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
More patient now than in the future 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.67 771
(0.38) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.45 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 0.70 771
(0.50) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
67.87 -0.90 -3.25 -0.26 0.62 0.59 771
(23.47) (2.65) (2.68) (2.69) (3.16)
Number of ROSCA memberships 1.61 0.17 -0.07 0.07 0.18 0.05* 771
(0.88) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)
Why do you participate in ROSCAs? (Unprompted; More than one response possible)
0.94 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.86 770
(0.23) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
0.51 -0.05 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.30 770
(0.50) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Maximal Discount Rate in Present 
        and in Future
Amount invested in risky asset (out 
of 100 Ksh) 




Time and Risk Preferences
2
To have time to talk to my friends in 
the group/socialize
Notes: Exchange rate was roughly 75 Ksh to US $1 during the study period.  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 
rosca-level. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
1"Provider" is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual declared having given money to a relative or friend in the three months 
preceding the baseline survey, but not having asked money from a relative or friend over the same time period. 
2"Somewhat Patient" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent prefers 55 Ksh (or less) in 1 month to 40 Ksh now. "Present-
Biased" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits a higher discount rate between today and 1 month from today than 
between 1 month from today and 2 months from today.  
Sample Mean
(Std. Dev. )
Coefficient (std. errors) on Treatment Dummies: 
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Currently uses the saving technology* 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.93 0.71 0.66 0.71 0.97
If uses technology: Current Balance  (in Ksh):
Median 200 200 N/A 70 200 248 N/A 90
Mean 634 321 N/A 142 311 573 N/A 189
Std. Dev 1248 446 N/A 224 423 866 N/A 369
If uses: reports that technology "helped save more" 0.95 0.78 0.98 0.90 0.97 0.79 0.99 0.92
Panel B. Safe Box and Lockbox only
Still has box 0.94 0.88 0.92 0.87
If married: Spouse knows about the box 0.78 0.79 0.93 0.90
Ever Called Program Officer to get Lockbox opened 0.18 0.31
Refused key when offered at 6-month follow-up 0.75
Panel C. Health Pot only
If participates: Ever received health pot 0.30 0.58
Received health product in kind 0.48 0.55
Accompanied to buy health product at shop by ROSCA member - 0.13
Encouraged by others to use health pot funds buy health product - 0.36
Panel D. Health Savings Account only
Deposits
Total number of deposits 4.53 6.53
Sum of all deposits (in Ksh) 146 219
Withdrawals
If uses technology: Ever withdrew 0.32 0.48
Median withdrawal size, in Ksh 125 198
Mean withdrawal size, in Ksh 150 196
Purpose of Withdrawal
   Health Emergency 0.82 0.75
   Funeral 0.00 0.04
   To buy Preventative Health Product 0.18 0.21
Number of observations 102 197 137 220 101 180 114 220
Notes:  The data comes from unannounced home visits as well as ROSCA visits conducted after 6 months and 12 months. Data on balances in the boxes are based on direct observation 
by enumerators. Data on balances and withdrawals for the HSA group come from the HSA record book kept by treasurers for ROSCAs sampled for HSA.
Exchange rate was roughly 75 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. 
*Currently uses the technology = 1 if there is a non-zero amount in the box /HSA, or if contributes to health pot. 
After 6 Months After 12 months
33(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(P1) Safe Box 193.85 175.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.14 0.13
(82.11)** (85.13)** (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)** (0.06)**
(P2) Lockbox 64.84 49.89 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(67.26) (65.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(P3) Health Pot 356.33 332.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.15 0.13
(103.89)*** (100.04)*** (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)** (0.07)**
(P4) Health Savings Account 33.70 28.48 -0.14 -0.12 0.05 0.04
(61.74) (59.25) (0.06)** (0.06)* (0.05) (0.06)
Individual Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ROSCA Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 771 771 771 771 771 771
R-Squared 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.05
Mean of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 257.83 103.62 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.34
Std Dev of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 306.66 306.66 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48
P-value for joint significance 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.18 0.20 0.02** 0.03**
Implied impacts of products' features
Storage (S = P1) 193.85 175.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.14 0.13
(82.11)** (85.13)** (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)** (0.06)**
Earmarking for Preventive Health (Ep = P2 - P1) -129.01 -125.25 0.07 0.06 -0.15 -0.15
(81.39) (82.57) (0.05) (0.06)** (0.06)**
Social Commitment and Credit (C = P3 - P2)  291.49 282.12 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.15
(108.6)*** (103.62)*** (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)*** (0.06)**
Earmarking for Emergency Treatment (Ee = P4 - P1) -322.63 -303.53 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09
(76.81)** (78.4)* (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Table 3. Average Impacts of Saving Technologies after 12 months
Notes: Data from 12-month follow-up survey. OLS regressions. Columns 3-6: Linear probability model estimates. Individual controls include gender, age, time 
preferences, marital status, whether the respondent is a net provider of loans/gifts in the community, and an indicator variable for having been sampled for 
multiple treatments. Rosca level controls include the monthly ROSCA contribution as well as the stratification dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at the rosca-level. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
Columns 1-2: Dependent variable is the total amount spent on preventive health products between baseline and endline survey conducted after 12 months. 
Columns 3-4: Dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes, at endline, to the question: "Was there a time in the last 3 months 
when you or somebody in your household needed a specific medicine or a specific treatment, but you didn’t have enough to purchase it?"
Columns 5-6: Dummy equal to 1 if the health goal listed at baseline was reached. 
Amount (in Ksh) spent on 
preventative health products 
since baseline
Could not Afford Full Medical 
Treatment for an Illness 
in Past 3 Months
Reached Health Goal
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Safe Box 215.72 211.34 165.06 157.14
(102.72)** (104.14)** (92.93)* (94.75)
         X TRAIT = provider 24.66 240.38 39.15 250.49 144.74 309.8 131.76 288.9
(121.88) 0.06* (118.62) 0.05** (132.29) 0.02** (131.63) 0.04**
         X TRAIT = present-bias -166.43 49.29 -156.25 55.09 -405.59 -240.53 -369.80 -212.66
(130.64) 0.59 (131.01) 0.51 (174.39)** 0.15 (171.87)** 0.19
         X TRAIT = married - - - - 204.66 369.72 201.77 358.91
- - - - (169.03) 0.03** (169.16) 0.04**
Lockbox 29.11 14.88 -2.75 -10.41
(69.14) (68.46) (104.26) (105.45)
         X TRAIT = provider 244.09 273.2 286.48 301.36 273.17 270.42 269.19 258.78
(144.64)* 0.08* (140.84)** 0.05** (141.01)* 0.13 (132.91)** 0.13
         X TRAIT = present-bias 36.97 66.08 29.56 44.44 -154.38 -157.13 -123.60 -134.01
(104.78) 0.50 (104.21) 0.64 (148.67) 0.26 (140.28) 0.31
         X TRAIT =  married - - - - 117.81 115.06 98.01 87.60
- - - - (115.05) 0.29 (115.99) 0.42
Health Pot 246.5 231.34 484.6 484.68
(100.24)** (97.55)** (309.01) (314.15)
         X TRAIT = provider 496.94 743.44 516.50 747.84 620.35 1104.95 621.47 1106.15
(208.96)** 0.01*** (197.60)** 0.01*** (177.05)*** 0.01*** (184.64)*** 0.01***
         X TRAIT = present-bias 147.80 394.3 152.26 383.6 -217.13 267.47 -191.57 293.11
(232.72) 0.12 (231.02) 0.12 (176.88) 0.31 (179.54) 0.27
         X TRAIT =  married - - - - -258.17 226.43 -272.46 212.22
- - - - (309.53) 0.01*** (320.07) 0.02**
ROSCA Level Controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Level Controls included No Yes No Yes
Observations 771 771 568 568
R-Squared 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12
Mean of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 257.83 257.83 232.81 232.81
Std Dev of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 306.66 306.66 264.43 264.43
Share of sample with TRAIT = provider 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14
Share of sample with TRAIT = present-bia 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Share of sample with TRAIT = married 0.74 0.74
Notes: Data from 1-year follow-up survey. Columns 1 , 3, 5 and 7 present results of OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rosca-level. 
Columns 1 and 5 include only ROSCA-level controls (monthly ROSCA contribution as well as the stratification dummies). Columns 3 and 7 add individual controls (age, 
gender, and the "TRAITS").  Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 show the sum of the main effect and the interaction effect, for each trait and each experimental treatment, as estimated 
in the previous column, along with the p-values for these sums.  ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
See Table 1 notes for definition of provider and present-bias.
Dependent variable: Amt spent on preventative health products (Ksh)
FULL SAMPLE WOMEN ONLY
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Safe Box -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.15)
         X TRAIT = provider -0.26 -0.37 -0.28 -0.38 -0.09 -0.17 -0.08 -0.14
(0.18) 0.04** (0.18) 0.04** (0.27) 0.61 (0.26) 0.67
         X TRAIT = present-bias 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.09
(0.13)** 0.14 (0.13)** 0.15 (0.19) 0.51 (0.19) 0.66
         X TRAIT = married - - - - -0.10 -0.18 -0.09 -0.15
- - - - (0.21) 0.08* (0.20) 0.12
Health Savings -0.09 -0.08 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.13)
         X TRAIT = provider -0.37 -0.46 -0.38 -0.46 -0.27 -0.22 -0.26 -0.22
(0.19)** 0.01*** (0.18)** 0.01*** (0.28) 0.51 (0.27) 0.49
         X TRAIT = present-bias 0.06 -0.03 0.08 0.00 -0.14 -0.09 -0.18 -0.14
(0.11) 0.81 (0.11) 0.96 (0.18) 0.66 (0.18) 0.44
         X TRAIT = married - - - - -0.18 -0.13 -0.14 -0.10
- - - - (0.20) 0.25 (0.19) 0.33
Individual Level Controls included No Yes No Yes
Observations 771 771 568 568
R-Squared 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
Mean of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32
Std Dev of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Share of sample with TRAIT = provider 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14
Share of sample with TRAIT = present-bias 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Share of sample with TRAIT = married 0.74 0.74
See Table 4 notes. 
Negative coefficient estimates imply the treatments increase ability to cope with health emergencies.
Dependent Variable: Could not Afford Full Medical Treatment for an Illness in Past 3 Months
FULL SAMPLE WOMEN ONLY





Currently uses the saving technology* 0.39 0.48 0.53
If uses technology: Current Balance  (in Ksh):
Median 200 - 105
Mean 706 - 251
Std. Dev 1640 - 434
If uses: reports that technology "helped save more" 0.69 0.97 0.84
Safe Box and Lockbox
Still has box 0.65
If married: Spouse knows about the box 0.91
Reports saving in the box for at least one specific goal 0.83
Reports saving in the box for at least one goal that is health related 0.63
If ever used box: Total of all deposits




Proportion reporting "a lot" 0.21
If ever used box: Total of all withdrawals




Proportion reporting "a lot" 0.21
Health Pot
Participated in first health pot cycle 0.81
If participated to first health pot cycle: received pot 0.95
Received health product in kind 0.65
Health Savings only
If uses technology: Ever withdrew 0.73
Median withdrawal size, in Ksh 200
Mean withdrawal size, in Ksh 308
Purpose of Withdrawal
   Health Emergency 0.78
   Funeral 0.03
   To buy Preventative Health Product 0.06
   Other 0.16
Total Number of observations 71 60 78
After 3 Years
* Currently uses the technology = 1 if there is a non-zero amount in the box /HSA, or if contributes to health pot. 
1We pool the Safe and Lockboxes because we gave the key back after 12 months (almost 2 years prior to this follow-
up).
37Table 7. Spillovers: Diffusion of Saving Technologies
(1) (2) (3)
Has a functioning 
Health Pot scheme
 at 3-year Followup





Control Group 0.111 0.222 18
Safe Box 0.105 0.053 19
Lockbox 0.038 0.038 26
Health Pot 0.565 0.043 23
Health Savings Account 0.038 0.654 26
Total 112
Notes: These are averages by group. Data is from follow-up conducted approximately 33 months after 
start of experiment. ROSCAs that were not functioning at the time of the follow-up are coded as not 
having a functioning Health Pot nor an HSA scheme. Data missing for one ROSCA (in Safe Box group) 
for which no member could be traced for follow-up.





Panel A: Mechanisms behind the Safe Box effect
Why did the box help you save more? (N=111)
   Way to save small change 0.33
   Money in box is not immediately on hand 0.32
   Reduces spending on luxury items 0.19
   The presence of the box encouraged me to save 0.06
   Less prone to theft 0.06
   The box is secret / other people don't know about it 0.02
Panel B: Safe Box and Requests from Others
Whole Sample (N=694)
Agree with statement: if somebody asks  me for money and I have cash on hand,  2.35
 I am obligated to give them something (1-5; higher values = disagree) (1.34)
Safe Box Group (N=93)
Agree with statement: if somebody asks  me for money and I have cash on hand,  2.70
         I am obligated to give them something (1-5; higher values = disagree) (1.46)
Agree with statement: if somebody asks  me for money and I have cash in the box, 4.30
        I am obligated to give them something (1-5; higher values = disagree) (1.20)
Both Box Groups
a
If somebody from outside your household comes to ask for money, is it  (N=159)
        easier to say no if money is in the box? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.81
If your spouse asks for money, is it easier to say no if the money is in the box? (N=119)
       (0=no, 1=yes) -- married respondents only 0.43
Why did the box help you to refuse requests for money? (N=111)
   Money in box is for a specific goal 0.51
   People don't know there is money in the box 0.24
   Can't access money since the box is kept elsewhere 0.09
   The box is secret / other people don't know about it 0.06
   Can't easily access box since it's hidden 0.05
   I can pretend I don't have the key 0.01
Panel C. Did Peer Pressure play a role in the HSA effect? (N=43)
Knew how much all others in the ROSCA were saving in their HSA 0.23
Knew how much some but not all others in the ROSCA were saving in their HSA 0.53
Reports that own HSA savings behavior was influenced by what others were doing 0.14
Notes: See section 7 of text for details. 
aWe pool the two box groups because the Lockbox group was given the key after 1 year, effectively transforming the 
Lockbox into a Safe Box.







Health Pot -0.08 -0.09
(0.12) (0.12)
Health Savings Accounts -0.02 -0.12
(0.11) (0.12)
ROSCA-level controls No Yes
Number of ROSCAs 112 112
R-squared 0.07 0.20





Notes: Regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 
Data is from follow-up conducted approximately 33 months after start of experiment. Data missing for one 
ROSCA (in Safe Box group) for which no member could be traced for follow-up.
aThe Safe Box and Lockbox groups are pooled since individuals in the Lockbox group were given the key after 1 
year, i.e. approximately 2 years before the long-run follow-up.
(3)










A1. Who participates in ROSCAs?
To study the determinants of ROSCA participation, we use data from an ongoing savings
project we are conducting with a random sample of households in Western Kenya (Dupas
et al. 2011). Unlike the current study, participants in that study were sampled from a census
of all households in three villages, and should therefore be representative of households in
the area. We collected background characteristics and ROSCA participation from every
respondent in that sample. In total, we have data on 2,580 adults in 1,693 households. We
present this data in Appendix Table A6, in which we regress ROSCA participation on several
background characteristics.
In Column 1, we include standard demographic variables including gender, marital status,
age, and a measure of wealth (the value of animals owned).29 Consistent with other studies,
we ﬁnd that women are much more likely to join ROSCAs than men (by close to 15 percentage
points, on an average participation rate of 41 percent), but marital status does not appear
to be a driver. We also ﬁnd that more educated and richer individuals are more likely to
join ROSCAs, and that older people are less likely.
In Column 2, we include other controls, including measures of risk aversion and time
discounting identical to those presented in Table 1. We ﬁnd that people who are more risk
loving are more likely to join. We ﬁnd no evidence that patience or time inconsistency aﬀect
participation. These results suggest that present-bias may not be the primary driver of
ROSCA participation in our study context.
A2. External Validity
To the extent that our sample is representative of 40% of the population, the impacts that
we present in the paper are only applicable to these 40%. How would the four saving devices
we introduced likely impact the rest of the population? We can only speculate on that point.
The fundamental question is whether people who are not currently in ROSCAs have a lower
or higher unmet demand for savings. If those people who do not participate in ROSCAs are
simply less interested in saving, then the impact of any of our technologies would of course
be lower. If, however, some people do not join ROSCAs for other reasons (for example,
because they do not have the time for regular meetings), then the impact could be higher
29We also include village ﬁxed-eﬀects in this regression.
41since those not in ROSCAs have no less interest in saving but fewer options to save securely.
Even aside from this issue, the impact of the two ROSCA-level treatments (the Health
pot and the Health Savings Account) would also likely diﬀer for non-ROSCA participants.
Since both these schemes require some level of trust in others (either the co-contributors to
the health pot or the treasurer of the HSA), non-ROSCA participants might be less likely
to take them up since they might not be able to identify a group they trust enough to start
either scheme. Potentially, these schemes could be run by a bank, but even banks are (often
rightfully) viewed with suspicion in the area (Dupas et al. 2011).
A3. Why Didn’t ROSCAs Start These Programs on
Their Own?
The last important question is why, if these savings technologies had such big eﬀects, in-
dividuals did not come up with them on their own. After all, none of the technologies we
introduced required anything new. In fact, the Health Pot was simply applying the concept
of the ROSCA speciﬁcally to health products. The idea of earmarking was not novel either,
since many ROSCAs use spending agreements for their main pot (Gugerty 2007). Our only
innovation was the focus on health. Likewise, ROSCAs could easily implement the HSA
scheme on their own. We provided those sampled for the HSA encouragement with a nice-
looking ledger to record deposits and withdrawals, but a cheap exercise book available at
the local store could have served the same purpose. Finally, the boxes we oﬀered were made
by hand by a local artisan. They cost about $2 each, including the lock. People could make
the box themselves and would only have to invest in a lock, at a cost of $1. In fact, in other
parts of Africa, people make lockboxes that do not actually require a lock – they just have
a narrow slit that allows deposits but not withdrawals (Shipton 1990). Why didn’t people
in our study area do this on their own?
We asked people this question directly (in an open ended way) in our long-term follow-up,
and coded their answers. Results are presented in Appendix Table A7. For the box, only
3% of respondents reported that they were using a savings box already (typically made out
of wood). Almost all other respondents answered that they had “never thought of it” (88%).
Only 8% reported the problem was the expense. For the Health Pot, 72% said they had
never thought of it. The remainder said that they had not thought of ROSCAs as something
that could be used for health-speciﬁc savings (rather than for savings for other purposes).
For the HSA, the answers were similar: 77% reported that they had not thought of the idea
and 23% reported that they had not thought of ROSCAs as a place to save for health.
42While these answers are not really satisfactory in the sense that they do not really get
at the bottom of why people did not think of it on their own, they suggest that once these
ideas have been introduced, they should diﬀuse, which is exactly what we observe in section
6.2.






2=1 3=1 4=1 5=1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Members in ROSCA 17.78 17.70 17.62 13.52 18.08 0.29 0.98 0.95 0.10 0.91
(7.00) (10.41) (9.84) (6.07) (6.75)
Female Only ROSCA 0.33 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.27 0.93 0.83 0.73 0.85 0.66
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.47) (0.45)
0.70 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.44 0.43 0.33 0.82
(0.31) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.32)
Number of meetings per month 2.33 1.95 2.39 2.26 2.15 0.75 0.31 0.88 0.84 0.61
(1.14) (1.03) (1.27) (1.14) (1.12)
Contribution Size, Monthly Equivalent (in Ksh) 522 353 344 380 397 0.44 0.11 0.08* 0.17 0.21
(483) (292) (288) (282) (277)
Pot Size (in Ksh) 4209 3295 3115 3100 3397 0.84 0.41 0.29 0.30 0.44
(4309) (3068) (3388) (3648) (2523)
ROSCA provides loans to members 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.94 0.82 0.99 0.29
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43)
ROSCA has an insurance pot 0.39 0.45 0.60 0.52 0.65 0.41 0.71 0.18 0.40 0.09*
(0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.49)
Predetermined Order 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.67 1.00 0.34 1.00 0.35
0.00 0.00 (0.20) 0.00 (0.20)
0.94 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.33 0.49 0.73 0.52
(0.24) (0.38) (0.34) (0.29) (0.33)
"Health Script" happened in the morning 0.17 0.35 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.41 0.16 0.92 0.77 0.83
(0.38) (0.49) (0.37) (0.34) (0.40)
Number of Roscas (Total = 113) 18 20 26 23 26
Share of Female Members
"Health Script" happened during regular meeting
Control 
Group
Treatment Groups: P-Values for Test of: 
44Appendix Table A2. Baseline Health Savings Goal







Container Bednet Latrine Gum Boots
Money in Case 
of 
Emergencies
Safe Box -63.40 -0.53 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.06
(64.01) (0.24)** (0.04)* (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)**
Lockbox 80.89 0.08 -0.14 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.06
(90.98) (0.27) (0.04)*** (0.03) (0.03)* (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)** (0.03)*
Health Pot 105.89 -0.24 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.02
(90.45) (0.24) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Health Savings 45.91 0.11 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04
(76.95) (0.27) (0.04)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
p-value for F-test joint significance 0.39 0.05** 0*** 0.24 0.35 0.24 0.79 0.20 0.001***
Control Mean 548.26 2.56 0.25 0.07 0.06 0.32 0.04 0.10 0.16
Control Std. Dev. 742.71 3.14
Observations 823 829 832 832 832 832 832 832 832
Notes: Data collected at baseline. Individual controls include gender, age, time preferences, marital status, whether the respondent is a net provider of loans/gifts in 




to reach Goal 
(self-assessed)
Months needed 
to reach Goal 
(self-assessed)
45Appendix Table A3. Attrition in 6- and 12-month follow-ups
(1) (2)
Safe Box 0.061 -0.003
(0.057) (0.033)
Lock Box 0.015 -0.012
(0.033) (0.031)




















Mean of Dep. Var. (Control Group) 0.054 0.081
Could not be interviewed at 
midline (after 6 months)
Could not be interviewed at 
endline (after 12 months)
Maximal Discount Rate in Present and in Future
Notes: see Table 1 notes for the definitions of the variables. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
 Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rosca-level. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%.
46Appendix Table A4. Determinants of Take-up of Savings Technologies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
6 months 1 year 6 months 1 year 6 months 1 year 6 months 1 year 6 months 1 year
Provider 14.77 -97.73 197.45 275.77 0.08 0.14 -12.22 -49.10 0.28 -0.02
(321.63) (60.63) (115.19)* (200.29) (0.06) (0.07)* (38.85) (80.66) (0.09)*** (0.04)
Present-Bias -715.61 -184.34 70.91 -124.40 -0.07 -0.11 10.33 -45.58 -0.09 -0.05
(386.73)* (134.26) (89.34) (302.31) (0.09) (0.12) (38.04) (53.01) (0.15) (0.05)
Married female 144.18 52.00 27.47 26.72 -0.14 0.13 -70.27 -58.09 -0.07 -0.01
(244.27) (117.12) (61.48) (142.95) (0.08)* (0.07)* (58.89) (53.03) (0.13) (0.02)
Age 19.80 51.79 33.99 -54.46 -0.01 -0.02 3.19 -3.00 -0.03 0.02
(110.37) (53.43) (26.51) (60.68) (0.03) (0.02) (10.25) (13.42) (0.04) (0.01)**
Female -121.98 34.48 -129.73 -183.12 0.03 0.04 44.92 52.98 0.09 -0.03
(319.15) (97.00) (100.80) (152.40) (0.12) (0.10) (50.59) (62.24) (0.16) (0.02)
Patient now, impatient later -294.15 -61.82 171.45 -16.83 0.04 0.00 -12.12 -29.11 -0.02 0.02
(373.77) (106.67) (96.98)* (192.20) (0.08) (0.11) (33.61) (36.89) (0.12) (0.02)
Maximal Discount Rate in Present 8.22 3.63 -67.44 -348.65 0.00 -0.10 -11.24 -12.58 0.00 -0.03
  and in Future (404.33) (134.18) (59.24) (176.18)* (0.06) (0.10) (25.37) (30.18) (0.08) (0.03)
ROSCA controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 102 101 188 180 188 180 220 220 161 156
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.35 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.28 0.15
Mean of dependent variable 465.85 221.61 220.31 375.51 0.18 0.31 146.36 219.18 0.93 0.97
SD of dependent variable 1104.97 383.79 398.13 751.78 0.38 0.46 223.84 378.12 0.25 0.16
Notes:  The data comes from unannounced home visits as well as ROSCA visits conducted after 6 months and 12 months. Data on balances in the boxes are based on direct observation 
by enumerators. Data on balances and withdrawals for the HSA group come from the HSA record book kept by treasurers for ROSCAs sampled for HSA.
Exchange rate was roughly 75 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. 
Safe Box Lock Box Health Savings Account Health Pot
Amount in Box Amount in Box
Had called to have box 
opened
Total Deposits Took up Health Pot
47Appendix Table A5. Representativeness of 3-year Follow-up Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Unlocked Box
6 months 1 Year 6 months 1 Year
Completed long-term follow-up 0.045 -0.048 -8.817 72.317
  survey (0.090) (0.091) (223.412) (76.511)
Mean for those not completing survey 0.72 0.74 469.48 187.25
S.D. for those not completing survey 0.45 0.45 1139.30 359.63
Observations 102 101 102 101
Panel B. Locked Box
6 months 1 Year 6 months 1 Year
Completed long-term follow-up -0.114 -0.034 34.061 22.970
  survey (0.069) (0.072) (59.275) (113.560)
Mean for those not completing survey 0.73 0.67 206.55 365.68
S.D. for those not completing survey 0.45 0.47 325.44 679.68
Observations 188 180 188 180
Panel C. Health Pot
6 months 1 Year 6 months 1 Year
Completed long-term follow-up 0.092 0.006 -0.015 0.022
  survey (0.087) (0.089) (0.033) (0.027)
Mean for those not completing survey 0.62 0.71 0.98 0.98
S.D. for those not completing survey 0.49 0.46 0.13 0.15
Observations 137 114 89 75
Panel D. Health Savings Account
6 months 1 Year 6 months 1 Year
Completed long-term follow-up -0.020 -0.021 -8.964 -22.669
  survey (0.058) (0.057) (31.194) (51.744)
Mean for those not completing survey 0.79 0.80 138.45 194.67
S.D. for those not completing survey 0.41 0.40 247.15 425.80
Observations 220 220 220 220
Notes: To check the representativeness of the long-term follow-up sample, this table compares the 6-month and 12-month 
take-up figures among those interviewed for the long-term follow-up (after 33 months) and the full sample. All regressions 
include strata fixed effects.  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rosca-level. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 
and 10%.
Uses Box Amount in Box
Uses Box Amount in Box











Female * Married -0.020 -0.024
(0.055) (0.055)
Value of animals (1000 Ksh) 0.003 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)***







Patient Now, Impatient Later -0.032
(0.037)
Maximal Discount Rate in Present and Future -0.042
(0.033)
Observations 2580 2580
# of households 1693 1693
R-squared 0.047 0.051
Mean of the dependant variable 0.412 0.412
Appendix Table A6. Determinants of ROSCA Participation
Notes: Data taken from a random sample of households in Western Kenya. Standard 
errors, clustered at the household level, in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance 
at 1, 5 and 10%.
See Table 1 for definition of time preference measures. 
aThe risky asset paid off 4 times the amount invested with probability 0.5 and 0 
otherwise.
49Appendix Table A7. Answers to semi-qualitative surveys administered at Long-Term Follow-up
(1) (2) (3)
Why didn't you adopt this saving technology on your own?
   N/A, was already using this technology 0.03 0.00 0.00
   Never thought of it 0.88 0.72 0.77
   Expensive 0.08 - -
   ROSCAs are not for health - 0.28 0.23
   Afraid money would be stolen 0.01 0.00 0.00
Notes: Data is from follow-up conducted 33 months after project started.
1We pool the two box groups because the Lock Box group was given the key after 1 year.
Box
1 Health Pot HSA
50